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Abstract. Recent developments in banking sector in Latvia especially related with PNB Bank where bank accounts 
of many retired people were located leads to requirements for proficiency of Finance Regulator which has to be 
efficiently financed, stable and professional. In different countries Finance Regulators have different models of their 
financing. Aim of the study is to investigate different approaches for Finance Regulator financing and analyse expert 
views on possible development of Finance Regulator financing model in Latvia. Research methods applied: scientific 
publications and previous conducted research results analysis and expert survey for possible financing model changes 
in Latvia. In expert survey for analysis of expert views in many cases it was used evaluation scale 1-10 to better 
analyse expert views. For analysis of expert views it was used indicators of descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations 
and factor analysis. Research results indicated that Latvia has a great challenge for best possible model of Finance 
Regulator financing as the current financing model causes problems as currently Finance Regulator is financed by 
existing finance institutions which Finance Regulator has to monitor. 
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Introduction 
The relatively recent global crisis has highlighted the need for supervisory models to change and the importance 
of regulation in the financial system, both nationally and globally. Recent developments in banking sector in Latvia 
especially related with PNB Bank where bank accounts of many retired people were located leads to requirements for 
proficiency of Finance Regulator which has to be efficiently financed, stable and professional. In different countries 
Finance Regulators have different models of their financing. The Single Supervisory Mechanism was established in 
Europe at the end of 2014, reinforcing macro-prudential supervision, which focuses on ensuring stability at the level 
of individual financial institutions to ensure the stability of the financial system as a whole and cooperation between 
ECB and EU competent authorities (financial market supervisors) (FKTK, 2014). Financial and capital market 
regulation and supervision in Latvia has become more prominent in 2018, with particular attention to certain aspects 
of supervision and its importance in combating financial crime in a global context. Due to the weaknesses of the 
financial system, as demonstrated by the situation with AS ABLV Bank, risk reduction in the financial sector has been 
initiated in Latvia, which in turn leads to a significant outflow of financing from Latvian banks. The share of foreign 
deposits in Latvian commercial banks in September 2019 is 19.5%, since 2015 this proportion has decreased by 34 pp 
(FKTK, 2019). This, in turn, poses a risk to the financing of the Latvian financial regulator. 
In 2019, the banking sector is still questioning the public in the shadow financial supervision segment, as five 
Latvian commercial banks, which are almost a third of Latvian commercial banks, are exposed to high risk. This is 
also evidenced by the suspension and liquidation of AS PNB Banka, where many pensioners had their money. In 
addition to the ability of the financial regulator to be effectively funded, there is a very significant ability to 
communicate with the public about financial literacy issues 
The status of the Latvian financial regulator analyzed in the study is a derivative public entity with the status of an 
autonomous public authority and with its own resources, and its purpose is to regulate and supervise the Latvian 
financial and capital market and its members and to encourage investors, depositors and insurers. Protection of 
personal interests and development and stability of the financial and capital market in Latvia. 
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The topic of the research is topical because the financing of the Latvian financial regulator has become very topical 
both for the regulator and society, because finance regulator needs to obtain the necessary funds for its financing. The 
financial market regulator needs to develop a financing model that can cover the operating costs of the regulator, as 
well as capital and development-oriented costs, both for research, functional audits and change management 
consultancy, in order to fulfill its regulatory and the priorities set in the monitoring strategy. In order for the financial 
regulator to purposefully provide the prerequisites for it to function as a modern and socially beneficial organization 
that ensures systemic protection of clients' interests and financial market stability, safe financial market regulation 
according to Latvian conditions, it needs an appropriate financing management solution corresponding with best 
praxis in developed counties. 
The aim of the study was to study the financing models in the world for financial and capital market supervisors, 
and to find out the financial and capital market supervisors' opinion with the results of the survey and financial sector 
experts with the results of the Latvian financial regulator principles for improving the financial regulator's finances. 
The research question was to ensure the sustainability of the FCMC's funding, is there a need to change the FCMC's 
funding principles? 
Tasks of the research included analyzing special literature on sustainable financial planning, analyzing financing 
models of foreign financial sector supervisors, analyzing the activities of Latvian financial regulator and regulating 
its activities, including financing legislation, as well as financial sector expert, opinion on the current financing model 
of the Latvian financial regulator and possible changes, to find out the opinion of Latvian financial and capital market 
participants on the financing of their supervision, to analyze and evaluate the FCMC's goals, tasks for sustainable 
development, 
The research methods were scientific literature and legislation of the Republic of Latvia, foreign law, data analysis 
published by foreign competent authorities;  the justification of their application are based on scientific articles, 
publications, databases and internet resources of empirical management scientists and economists and empirical 
methods: empirical data acquisition method – expert survey of financial and capital market participants, as well as 
industry experts' survey;, data processing methods (qualitative data processing with discourse analysis, quantifiable 
questions with descriptive statistics characteristics - central tendency or location indices (arithmetic mean, mode, 
median), indicators of variability - range, standard deviation, standard error of arithmetic mean standard error 
correlation analysis, factor analysis with varimax rotation. Empirical data analysis performed with SPSS data 
processing software, 
Literature Review 
Structural reforms of financial system regulators in the world 
The rapid development of the financial system has led to structural reforms of financial regulators, which also 
include financing issues. 
Supervision and regulation of the financial sector is vital to the development of the financial system and the 
economy. In Latvia, the stability, competitiveness and development of the financial and capital market are promoted 
by the Financial and Capital Market Commission (FCMC), which regulates and supervises the activities of Latvian 
financial and capital market entities. 
A 2009 personal analysis by S.Seelig and A.Novoa (Novoa, Seelig,,2009.) of the governance structure and 
practices of supervisory authorities and policies related to public transparency and accountability in the world ((Novoa, 
Seelig, 2009), covers 140 organizations from 103 countries, and Table 1 shows the variety of types of monitoring 
structures that exist in the world. 
Table 1 
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Types of Finance Regulation Supervisory Authorities in 2007  
 Number Proportion,% 
Banking supervision 44 31 
Insurance supervision 16 11 
Supervision of the financial instruments market (securities market) 25 18 
Consolidated supervision 1 18 13 
Integrated supervision 2 32 23 
Another  5 4 
Souce: Author’s construction based on IMF documents 
Latvia currently represents the consolidated supervisory model and, as Table 1 shows, is not the dominant 
supervisory body. Among the surveyed, 31% was represented by the European region, covering 74% of the potential 
European bodies. In his study, E. Wymeersch found that several models of financial supervision in Europe have 
evolved over time: from the traditional three-pillar or institutional model (banking, insurance and securities) to an 
intermediate "double-peak" model closer to the functional approach , Unified or Integrated Model (Wymeersch, 2007). 
The IMF study (Novoa, Seelig, 2009) have indicated that the independence (in the context of the study, it is defined 
as the ability of a financial supervisor to carry out its activities without undue political or commercial interference, 
focusing on operational independence)) of the financial sector supervisor is one of the key factors influencing 
supervisory effectiveness. Such aspects are evaluated as very important also by other researchers (Preda, 2005; Fallon, 
2015; Qiao, 2013). According to IMF study (Novoa, Seelig, 2009), 60% of financial sector supervisors are managed 
by a board or council and have the following functions: 
• defining and monitoring the strategic direction of the institution; 
• development of regulatory and supervisory policies; 
• approve / ratify key supervisory activities, including sanctions and license revocations. 
In accordance with good management practice, many financial supervisors managed by a board of directors are 
entrusted to the executive director and only a small majority of the supervisory board is chaired by the head of the 
supervisory authority, as is the case with Latvia. Such a management model is not common (Novoa, Seelig, 2009) in 
the management of consolidated supervision. 
The independence of the Latvian financial sector supervisory authority is enshrined in the Law on the Financial 
and Capital Market Commission *Saeima, 2000). It does not follow from this law that decisions taken by the FCMC 
should be challenged, nor does it determine the higher authority to which the FCMC would be subject to its functions 
(Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia, 2019). Accordingly, other regulatory enactments, which detail the 
competence of the FCMC and provide for control of the legality of its decisions (eg, Law on Credit Institutions, Law 
on Payment Services and Electronic Money, Law on the Financial Instruments Market) do not provide for contestation 
of the FCMC's decisions (Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia, 2019). Thus, the decisions of the FCMC can be 
appealed immediately in court. Consequently, the claim for compensation for the losses caused by the decision of the 
FCMC must also be filed in court (Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia, 2015). The FCMC Council has the right 
to approve the FCMC budget and to determine the payments of financial and capital market participants to finance 
the activities of the Commission, presenting them to the FCMC advisory financial and capital market council, which 
has the right to express their opinion on them. These decisions of the FCMC Council are also not open to challenge. 
Thus, it can be concluded that in Latvia the independence of the financial supervisory authority from the legal point 
                                                          
1 Single, fully consolidated supervisors supervising the entire financial sector (banks, insurance and securities firms). 
Single, fully consolidated supervisors overseeing the entire financial sector (banks, insurance and securities market companies). 
2 Integration of different levels of supervision, usually through the supervision of different combinations of two types of financial intermediaries 
(eg banks and insurance companies, banks and securities firms, etc.). 
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of view is ensured, thus, there are preconditions for the institution to achieve high operating results, also ensuring its 
efficiency. 
With regard to the financing of supervisory authorities, the study by the IMF (Novoa, Seelig, 2009) indicates that 
an important factor for both the independence of the supervisory authority and its effectiveness is its ability to 
determine its budget and funding allocations. Nearly 60% of all supervisors in the financial sector indicated that they 
had these opportunities. With the exception of the Integrated Supervisory Authorities, most supervisors have indicated 
in the survey that they have de facto power to set final budgets and allocations. This relationship exists geographically, 
with the exception of Latin American countries, where supervisory authorities are more likely to lack budgetary 
independence. Given that the quality of financial sector supervision depends to a large extent on the ability of the 
supervisory authority to attract and retain sufficient qualified staff, the ability to determine wages and the number of 
employees is a very important factor in the supervisory mandate. 
The IMF study identifies three sources of funding for supervisors: 
• central banks; 
• regulated entities or supervisory entities; 
• Government grants. 
The study (Novoa, Seelig, 2009) points out that central bank money is the most important source of funding for 
financial sector supervisors. 90% of supervisors at central banks are financed mainly by their central banks. In addition, 
central bank money is often used to cover the costs of financial sector supervisors outside the central bank. 
The second largest source of funding for supervisors comes from the fees charged to supervisors. About 76% 
(Novoa, Seelig, 2009) of insurance and securities market regulators alone receive funding from market participants – 
this argument is supported also by other researchers (Palepu, et al., 2008; Haslam, 2010; Holland, 2009). However, 
only 35% of bank regulators depend on bank payments. The IMF study (Novoa, Seelig, 2009) concludes that a much 
higher percentage outside central banks depends on the income from market payments. Some researchers have stressed 
communication importance (Liff, Wahlström, 2018) and also money laundering aspect has to be taken into account 
(De Koker, 2009).  
Slightly more than a quarter of supervisors receive grants from their central government, according to an IMF 
study (Novoa, Seelig, 2009), with 45% of securities regulators citing government appropriations as the second most 
important source of funding. A quarter of insurance regulators receive state funding, but only 8% of banking 
supervisors receive state funding. 
With regard to supervisory authorities whose revenue comes from payments made by supervisors, half of them 
have indicated that fees are set by law. The majority of other supervisors (36%) (Novoa, Seelig, 2009) imposed 
regulatory payments, which often involve consultation with the responsible government body, the ministry, according 
to an IMF study. 
The authors (Novoa, Seelig, 2009) have mainly researched the funding models of supervisors in EU Member States 
and concluded that supervisors are financed by: 
• from the state budget; 
• from the state budget, but the supervisors cover the operating expenses of the supervisory authority according to 
the prescribed procedure by making payments to the state budget; 
• from central bank financing; 
• from payments made by supervisors, with contributions paid into the supervised current account. 
Accountability mechanisms are one of the most important tools by which governments protect and improve the 
functioning of public sector organizations. The key question is: how will public sector responsibility become more 
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effective? (Schillemans, 2016). And stresses importance of the role of the government (Cooray, 2011). Thomas 
Schillemans has stressed that in order to answer this question, it is necessary to combine two largely separate lines of 
research: public administration research on real-world organizations and pilot studies on the impact of different forms 
of accountability on decision-making. T. Schillemann has developed a calibrated model of public accountability (the 
CPA model) that can be used to explore how accountability can be calibrated to meet the requirements of 
organizations' tasks. 
In modern governance systems, many (quasi) public organizations provide public policy. This has made 
responsibility increasingly important for regulating, coordinating and controlling organizations involved in public 
policy (Christensen, Lægreid. 2011). Public sector organizations are now operating in an increasingly frequent 
"accountability network" where they need to explain and justify their decisions and performance to various 
"accountability forums" (Bovens, Schillemans, Goodin. 2014) such as government audits, auditors, critical clients and 
the media. Over the last decade, research interest in 'accountability' has doubled across different academic disciplines 
(Schillemans, 2016), on failures of bank management and problems in finance regulator activities (Holland, 2019), on 
legal aspect challenges (Zekos, 2003). Several researchers have pointed out problems in regimes of regulators 
(Murphy, 2006). On those issues some other aspects could be researched deeper. 
Research results and discussion 
Characteristics of the factors characterizing the financial market of Latvia for the structure of financing 
In order to find out the opinion of Latvian financial market subjects on FCMC financing issues and their close 
relation with the supervision and regulation service provided by the FCMC, a targeted survey was conducted - to find 
out and summarize the views of market participants: 
1) the most appropriate components for determining funding; 
2) the adequacy of the payment base to market participants; 
3) on changes in the financing of the functions of the FCMC; 
4) the independence of supervision and the adequacy of the payment for the service. 
The paper will analyze survey questions that address factors that share common features in the relationship between 
a supervisor / regulator service and funding, or the size, relevance, distribution, or other proportion of funding. 
 At the end of 2017, the FCMC oversaw 309 market participants, but by mid-2018 they were already 314 without 
capital market participants. 
The survey included 43 insurance market participants, 24 monetary financial institutions, 7 monetary non-financial 
institutions, 14 financial instruments and seven private pension funds. Unfortunately, neither the depositary, the stock 
exchange nor the issuers participated in the survey. 
The financial market participants were prepared with 11 statements, which they had to answer on a scale of 1 to 
10. The scale evaluated the extent to which the respondent agreed with these statements, with 1 strongly disagreeing 
and 10 strongly agreeing. 
The analysis of the replies to the claims led to the conclusion that they are united by common factors resulting 
from a complex factor analysis, the results of which are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
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Results of factor analysis of survey ratings  
 Complex Factors 
Initial factors evaluated by experts 1 2 3 4 
 FCMC funding to be provided by market participants (those overseen by 
the Financial and Capital Market Commission) 
0,454 0,755 0,066 -0,025 
 Direct financing through payments from market participants provides 
independent market monitoring and regulation 
0,437 0,812 0,022 -0,071 
The payment base currently set for the market participant you represent 
is adequate for determining the payments for FCMC financing 
0,849 0,132 0,000 0,019 
The amount charged to market participants is currently fair across market 
segments (conditionally related to industry monitoring / regulatory costs) 
0,798 0,149 -0,018 0,010 
Market participants should provide / finance supervision / regulation of 
other market participants (if a segment is small / underdeveloped / other 
reasons) 
0,149 -0,109 0,803 0,034 
Market participants should be categorized according to their risk profile 
and, accordingly, be assigned an increase in funding for riskier market 
participants and a reduction in funding for less risky market participants 
-0,050 0,379 0,631 -0,332 
Market participants are to be classified according to their size, grouped 
into groups and fixed for each year according to their size 
-0,010 0,198 0,679 0,163 
All market participants need to set a minimum annual fee to fund the 
FCMC 
0,002 0,572 0,345 0,229 
 It is necessary to limit the maximum annual payments to all market 
participants in the financing of the FCMC 
-0,306 0,302 0,029 0,754 
Financial technology start-ups, which represent the innovative segment, 
should facilitate the financing of the FCMC 
0,333 -0,171 0,066 0,775 
Payment made to FCMC provides appropriate monitoring / regulation 
service 
0,695 0,216 0,148 0,030 
Method of Extraction of  Complex Factors: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation method: varimax with Kaiser normalization. . Rotation converged in 8 iterations 
Source: Author’s construction based on Rita Vajnaga conducted expert survey in 2019,  
Evaluation scale 1-10, where 1- not important; 10-very important 
As result of factor analysis there were calculated four complex factors indicating main principles could be taken 
into account from big amount of initial factors. 
Factor analysis focused the factors - the authors' calculations show four complex factors for the initially 11 
identified factors:  
Complex Factor I: Finance market participants' satisfaction with existing financing arrangements: consisting of 
initial factors: The payment base currently set by the market participant you represent is adequate for determining 
payments to the FCMC; The level of the fee charged to market participants is currently fair across market segments 
(determined relatively according to industry monitoring / regulatory costs); Payment made FCMC provides 
appropriate monitoring / regulation service.  
Complex Factor II: Supervisory interaction (and its financing) factor consisting of initial factors: The FCMC must 
be funded by market participants (those supervised by the FCMC); Direct financing through market participant 
payments provides independent market monitoring and regulation; All market participants need to set a minimum 
annual fee to fund the FCMC.  
Complex Factor III: The classification factor for market participants consisting of initial factors: Market 
participants should quote / finance supervision / regulation of other market participants (if segment is small / 
underdeveloped / new segment or other reasons); Market participants should be categorized according to their risk 
profile and, accordingly, be assigned an increase in funding for  a more risky player and a decrease in funding for a 
less risky player; Market participants should be categorized according to their size by grouping them and fixing a 
fixed level of funding according to their size on an annual basis.  
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Complex Factor IV: Factor in the granting of incentives to market participants consisting of initial factors: It is 
necessary to limit the maximum annual payments to all market participants in the financing of the FCMC; Financial 
technology start-ups, which represent the innovative segment, should facilitate the financing of the FCMC.  
To analyse deeper the expert opinions it was calculated main indicators of descriptive statistics on expert 
evaluations related to incentives of financial market participants – main results are included in table 3. 
Table 3 
Main indicators of descriptive statistics on expert evaluations on incentives to market participants 
 
Statistical Indicators Financial technology start-ups, which 
represent the innovative segment, should 
facilitate the financing of the FCMC. 
It is necessary to limit the maximum 
annual payments to all market 
participants in the financing of the 
FCMC 
N Valid 95 95 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 5.49 6.62 
Standard Error of Mean 0.306 0313 
Median 5 7 
Mode 5 10 
Standard Deviation 2.982 3.046 
Range 9 9 
Minimum 1 1 
Maximum 10 10 
Source: Author’s construction based on Rita Vanaga conducted expert survey in 2019,  
Evaluation scale 1-10, where 1- not important; 10-very important 
As data included in table 3 indicate that the expert views are quite different as the whole evaluation scale is covered 
with bigger variability for evaluated aspect “It is necessary to limit the maximum annual payments to all market 
participants in the financing of the FCMC” with arithmetic mean 6,62 and most often given evaluation – 10, 
characterised by mode; half of experts gave evaluation 7 or less and half of experts gave evaluation 7 or more.  
Distribution of evaluations of experts are included in figure 1. 
 
Source: Author’s construction based on Rita Vanaga conducted expert survey in 2019,  
Evaluatuon scale 1-10, where 1- not important; 10-very important 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of evaluations by experts on analysed aspect “It is necessary to limit the maximum annual 
payments to all market participants in the financing of the FCMC” 
 
As data included in table 3 indicate that the expert views are quite different as the whole evaluation scale is covered 
also for evaluated aspect “Financial technology start-ups, which represent the innovative segment, should facilitate 
the financing of the FCMC” with arithmetic mean 5,49 and most often given evaluation – 5, characterised by mode; 
half of experts gave evaluation 5 or less and half of experts gave evaluation 7 or more.  Distribution of evaluations of 
experts is included in figure 2. 
 
Source: Author’s construction based on Rita Vanaga conducted expert survey in 2019,  
Evaluation scale 1-10, where 1- not important; 10-very important 
Fig. 1. Distribution of evaluations by experts on analysed aspect “Financial technology start-ups, which 
represent the innovative segment, should facilitate the financing of the FCMC” 
 
Results of expert evaluations indicate that the financing model of finance regulator in Latvia has to be prepared 
using more detailed analysis of advantages and disadvantages of each financing model in other countries – more 
detailed research of experience in other countries could be studied in bigger detalisation and used for preparation of 
decisions. 
Conclusions, proposals, recommendations 
1. Different models of finance regulator’s organisation, management and financing have several advantages and 
disadvantages as it is indicated in experience analysis and research results investigation. 
2. Most important aspects are related to public trust for finance regulators to avoid problems for society, especially 
most sensitive part of inhabitants to those aspects – retired persons and not so well educated persons of society. 
3.  Expert views in Latvia are related to four most important factors affecting finance regulator financing aspects: 
finance market participants' satisfaction with existing financing arrange; supervisory interaction (and its financing) 
factor; the classification factor for market participants. 
4. Financing model of finance regulator in Latvia has to be prepared using more detailed analysis of advantages and 
disadvantages of each financing model in other countries. 
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